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According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Texas, when parents have voluntarily relinquished their right
to the custody of their child to others, who thereAdoption,
Custody of
upon formally adopt it; and both its parents and
Child
foster parents are fully capable of providing for it;
the court will not, on habeas corpus, return it to its parents,
unless it appears that it would be benefited by the change of
custody: Legate v. Legate, 28 S. W. Rep. 281 ; and in the
opinion of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, an adopted
Right
child will be accorded the same right of inherito Inherit

tance, both as to real and personal property, in

states whose laws are the same in this regard as those of his
domicile, as if his adoption had taken place in the former:
Mfelvin v. Mar'n, 30 Atl. Rep. 467. This is in full accord
with the general rule, which is, that the status of an adopted
child, under the laws of the state of his adoption, will be recog-
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nized and upheld in every other state, unless that status, or
the rights flowing therefrom, is inconsistent with, or in opposition to, the laws and policy of the state where it is sought to
be enforced: VanMatre v. Sankey, 148 II1. 536 ; S. C., 36
N. E. Rep. 628; K'gan v. Geraghty, ioi Ill. 26; Ross v.
Ross, 129 Mass. 243.
Judge Dallas, of the Circuit Court for the Eastern District
of .Pennsylvania, in In re Bodek, 63 Fed. Rep. 813, has very
succinctly defined the limit to the right of an alien
Aliens,
Naturalization to become a citizen of this country, a right which
has been too much abused in the interest of political parties.
According to Judge Dallas's opinion, the oath of an applicant
for naturalization to support the Constitution of the United
States, should not be accepted, if, upon examination, it appears
that he does not understand its significance, or is without such
knowledge of the constitution as is essential to the rational
assumption of an undertaking to support it; and the courts
should not admit an applicant to citizenship, without being
satisfied that he has at least some general comprehension of
what the constitution is, and of the principles which it affirms.
The requirements as to moral character and a disposition to
good order should also be shown by competent 'evidence.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has lately held, that
the owner of premises, who, with knowledge of the vicious
and dangerous character of a dog owned by his
Animals
agent, permits the agent to retain him, and to
allow him to run at large on the premises, is liable for any
damages done by him to a passer by: Harriv v. Fisher, 20
S. E. Rep. 461.
The master is also liable for damage done by his servant's
dog to sheep, if he knew its viciousness: Jacobsmeyer v.
Pogemoeller,47 Mo. App. 56o. An uncle who allows his
nephew, living with him, to keep a dog known to be vicious,
is liable for damage done by it: Snyder v. Patterson, 161 Pa.
98; S. C., 34 W. N. C. 288; 28 Atl. Rep. ioo6; and the
owner of the premises is liable, regardless of the ownership of
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the dog, if he suffers the dog to be on his premises, and exercises rights of ownership over him, knowing his vicious
character: Hornbein v. Blanchard,35 Pac. Rep. 187. But
directors of the poor are not liable for damages done by a dog,
kept by the steward of the poorhouse on the premises, and left
there after his removal from the county farm, there being no
evidence that they authorized or acquiesced in the animal's
presence : Sproat v. Directors of the Poor, 145 Pa. 598; S. C.,
29 W. N. C. 461 ; 23 Atl. Rep. 38o. And the owner of a
stable, who allows an eiploy36 to keep a vicious dog there, is
not liable to another employ6, who knew the dog's character
as well as the employer, but went voluntarily within his reach,
though he was securely chained at the time : Farley v. Picard,
78 Hun, 56o; S. C., 29 N. Y. Suppl. 802. There is a very
full collection of cases on this subject in 27 Am. L. REG. 63 1.
The Supreme Court of Oregon has recently decided a very
interesting question, in Darling v. Vulcan Iron Works, 38 Pac.
Apprentices Rep. 342, by holding that, under articles of apprenticeship, allowing a master to retain ten per
cent. of the apprentice's wages till the expiration of the contract, to be forfeited if he left the master's service without the
master's consent, or was discharged for any wilful violation of
the contract, and giving the master the right to terminate the
contract at any time on paying the apprentice the amount
standing to his credit, if the master arbitrarily discharges the
apprentice, without making such payment, he is liable, not
only for the amount standing to the apprentice's credit, but
also for all damages sustained 'by him by reason of his discharge.
The Supreme Court of Texas has affirmed the decision of
the Court of Civil Appeals, in Ci4' Natl. Bk. v. Zerch. Natd.
several interdepenAssignment Bk., 27 S. W. Rep. 848, that
titles to all of a
passing
trust,
of
deeds
dent.
for Benefit
of Creditors debtor's property subject to execution, for the
benefit of certain, creditors, with a proviso that the surplus, if
any, is to be distributed among his other creditors, holding
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legal claims, will constitute a general assignment: City Natl.
Bk. v. Merch. Natl. Bk., 28 S. W. Rep. 277; see I Am. L.
REG. & REV. (N. S.) 850.
It has been recently: decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri, in State v. Morgan, 28 S. W. Rep. 17, that (i) In proceedings on a sci.fa. to show cause why a judgBail
ment against the bondsmen for breach of the conLiability
dition of a recognizance of bail entered into by a defendant
should not be made absolute, the validity of the indictment
cannot be inquired into; (2) That such proceedings are so
nearly civil, that an answer over, after a demurrer is overruled, is a waiver of the demurrer; and (3) That the fact
that indictments similar to that drawn against defendant were
held bad, and the case in which his was held to be good overruled, is no excuse for his failure to appear according to the
condition of the recognizance. And the same court has
ruled, in State v. Murmann, 28 S. W. Rep. 2, that when the
surety produced his principal in court at the time
named in the recognizance, and the case was
called, the jury impanelled, the evidence taken, and a verdict
of guilty rendered, and thereupon a deputy sheriff took hold
of the principal, and left the court-room with him to conduct
him to jail, and no order was made for a continuance of the
case, this manual caption of the principal by the sheriff dispensed with the necessity of a formal surrender -of the principal, and the surety was discharged.
A formal surrender is not in all cases essential; and yet
the surety is so strictly held to his undertaking, that it is
always the safer course. Any act of the law, however, which
takes the principal out of the hands of the bail, as in the
present case, or which interferes with the power of the bail
over the principal, is justly held to release the surety. Accordingly, the surety is discharged, when, after the prisoner is
delivered by him to the sheriff, pursuant to an order of court,
he is then released by another order, made without the application or knowledge'of the bail, and escapes: Peo. v. McRey.nolds, (Cal.) 36 Pac. Rep. 590.
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But the re-arrest and conviction of the principal on the same
charge, after the bond has been forfeited, will not release the
sureties thereon: State v. Warwick, 3 Ind. App. 5o8. And
when the principal in a recognizance pleaded guilty, and was
fined on another charge, in the same court in which his presence was required by the recognizance, and was then taken by
a deputy sheriff to the clerk's office, where the fine was paid,
the whole time so spent not being over five minutes, the
detention was held not to release the surety; nor was he
released by a mere request to a deputy sheriff to take the
principal into custody: Pea. v. Robb, 98 Mich. 397; S. C.,
57 N. W. Rep. 257.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has very justly ruled,
that if a question is raised as to the truth of a statement in a
bid, which, under the law, would, on its face, entitle
the bidder to the contract, the awarding board
cannot decide that question against the bidder, and award the
contract to another, without giving the first bidder an opportunity to be heard: State v. Board of Choosen Freeholdersof
Hudson Co., 3o Atl. Rep. 548. But the Supreme Court of
Minnesota, in Elliott v. City of Minneapolis, 6o N. W. Rep.
i o8 i, maintains, that in the absence of fraud or abuse of discretion, a municipal corporation may award a contract to
another than the lowest bidder, if the municipal charter does
not prescribe the mode of awarding and entering into such
contracts, and if the contract made is otherwise within the
scope of the corporate powers. There is an excellent annotation on 'this subject in i Aht. L. REG. & REV. (N. S.) 899.
See also Ibid., 742, 819, 820, 851.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska has decided a most important question in regard to the rights of members of building
associations, in Randall v. Nat. Bdg. Loan & ProBuilding
Associations tective Uni.on, 6o N. W. Rep. IOI9, where it held,
that when a contract of membership in a building association
provided for the forfeiture of the stock in case any payment
should not be made when due; and a member having bor-
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rowed money on mortgage, made a number of payments on
the stock, and also on interest and premium, but then ceased
to pay, whereupon the association declared her stock forfeited,
and brought suit to foreclose the mortgage; the payments on
the stock should be applied as payments pro tanto on the loan,
in an accounting of the amount due on the. mortgage.
According to the Supreme Court of Florida, a supreme
court has power, on the common law suit of certiorari,to
review and quash the proceedings of inferior tribu-

nals, when they proceed in a cause without jurisdiction, or when their proceedings are essentially irregular,
-and not according to the requirements of law, and no appeal
or other direct mode of reviewing their proceedings exists.
'The writ in such a case, however, does not issue of right, but
rests in the sound discretion of the court; and when issued,
will not serve the puipose of a writ of error, or appeal, with
bill of exceptions. The office of such a writ, when issued to
review the proceedings of an inferior court, is to bring up for
inspection the entire record of the proceedings of that court, iii
order that the superior court may determine therefrom whether
the inferior court acted within its jurisdictional powers, or
whether its proceedings were essentially regular, and in accordance with the requirements of law: Jacksonville, T. & K. W.
Ry. Co. v. Boy, 16 So. Rep. 290.
The Circuit Court of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit, in
Theron v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 64 Fed. Rep. 84, has lately held,
that an action for death by wrongful act, occaConflict of
sioned in a state which gives three years within
Laws
which to bring suit therefor, may be maintained at any time
within the three years, in another state, which limits the time
of suit to two years; and the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
holds, that in such a case the amount recovered is to be distributed according to the laws of the place of the act which
caused the death: McDonald v. McDonald's Admr., 28 S.W.
Rep. 482.
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The great railroad strike is over, but the litigation to which
it gave rise is still vigorous. The Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Missouri has again passed upon the
effect of the Act of Congress of July 2, 1890, 26
Stat. at Large, 2o9, and in accordance with the current of
authority, ruled: (i) That a combination of railroad employ~s to prevent all the railroads of a large city, engaged in
carrying the United States mails, and in interstate commerce,
from carrying freight and passengers, hauling cars, and securing the services of persons other than strikers, and to induce
persons to leave the service of such railroads, is within the
first section of the act mentioned, which provides that every
contract, combination in the form of trust, or otherwise, " or
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce " among the
states, is illegal; (2) That under § 5 of the same act, an
injunction order, in an action to enjoin an illegal conspiracy
against interstate commerce, may provide that it shall be in
force on defendants not named in the bill, but who are within
the terms of the order, when it also provides that it is operative on all persons acting in concert with the designated conspirators, though not named in the writ, after the commission
of some act by them in furtherance of the conspiracy, and
service of the writ on them: U. S. v. Elliott, 64 Fed. Rep. 27.
See. In re Elliott, 62 Fed. Rep. 8oi, and i Af. L. REG. &
REV. (N. S.), 823.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the Gallitzin School
case, recently decided, missed an excellent opportunity to vindiConstitutional cate its ability, and, instead, laid itself open to
Law
severe censure. In that case it held, Williams, J.,
dissenting, that the employment by the school directors, in the
common schools, of nuns of the sisterhood of St. Joseph, a
religious society of the Roman Catholic Church, in the absence
of proof of'religious sectarian teaching or exercises, was purely
an exercise of the discretion of the directors, was lawful, and
not subject to review by the courts; (which is true, if the
premises are granted,) and then deliberately went on to hold,
in the coolest disregard of facts, that the wearing of the dis-
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tinctive garb and insignia of that sisterhood by the nuns,
while teaching in the public schools, coupled with free instruction in the catechism of their church to all who chose to
attend, both before and after school, could not be termed sectarian teaching, and" was not unlawful!! Hysong v. Schwol
Dist. of Gallitzin Borough, 3o Atl. Rep. 482. It would really
seem as if the learned court had forgotten the vast superiority
of practice over precept, and the peculiarly impressionable
nature of young children.
The Supreme Court of Washington has recently held that
a promise to a third party to accept a bill of exchange which
Contracts, has been, or is to be issued, does not fall within
Statute of
the statute of frauds; and that when the defendFrauds
ant authorized B. to draw certain orders,
which he
agreed to pay, and after those orders were drawn, told plaintiffs that if they would purchase them, he would afterwards
accept and pay them, and plaintiffs purchased some of the
said orders, the defendant cannot set up as a defence that the
plaintiffs were neither parties, privies, nor beneficially interested in his contract with B. : Kelley v. Greenoug/h, 38 Pac.
Rep. 158. The Court of Appeals of England has gone a step
farther, And held that a promise by the defendant, that, in consideration of plaintiff's accepting certain bills of exchangefor
a firm of which defendant's son was a partner, he, the defendant, would provide plaintiff with funds to meet those bills, is
a contract of indemnity from liability to make payment on
such bills, and not of guarantee, and, therefore, not within
the statute of frauds, and may be made orally: Guild v.
Conrad, [1894] 2 Q. B. 885. It seems to be now the generally accepted view, that, apart from special statutory provisions, a promise to accept a bill of exchange is not within the
statute of frauds, on the ground that the acceptance of a bill of
exchange is an original undertaking: Scudder v: Bank, 91
U.S. 4o6; Hallv. Cordell, 142 U. S. i16; S. C., I2 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 154; affirming Cordellv. Hall, 34 Fed. Rep. 866;
and Missouri and Pennsylvania, at least, have found it necessary to pass statutes requiring acceptances to be in writing:
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First Natl. Bk. of Rulo v. Gordon, 45 Mo. App. 293; Natl.
State Bk. of Camden v. Linderman, 161 Pa. 199; S. C., 28
Atl. Rep. 1022. But even when so required, no one but
the acceptor can raise the objection that the acceptance was
oral: U/rich v. Hower, 156 Pa. 414; S. C., 33 W. N. C. 17 ;
27 Atl. Rep. 243; Moeser v. Schneider, 158 Pa. 412; S. C.,
33 W. N. C. 259; 27 At. Rep. io88.
In general, a inere promise of indemnity to a third person is
not within the statute of frauds: Thomas v. Cook, 8 B. & C.
728 ; Wildes v. Dudlow, 19 L. -R. Eq. 198; In re Bolton, 8
T. L. R. 668; and this rule applies to a promise to indemnify
the surety on a liquor dealer's bond: Smith v. Delaney, 64
Conn. 264 ; S. C., 29 AtI. Rep. 496 ; to a contract of agency,
by which the agent agrees to be responsible .for the non-payment of debts which may thereafter become due by others:
Sutton v. Grey, 69 L. T. (N. S.) 354; to a promise to indemnify
one if he will indorse K.'s notes, so that K. can have them
discounted: Jones v. Bacon, 72 Hun, 5o6; S. C., 25 N. Y.
Suppl. 212; and to a verbal promise of A. to B., to indemnify
hirr if he will become surety for C. for a debt of the latter to D.:
Minick v. Huff, (Neb.), 59 N. W. Rep. 795. But it is held
in Illinois, that a guarantee of indemnity to a surety is within
the statute: Waterman v. Resseter, 45 Ill. App. 155 ; Farmers'
& Mecanics' Bk. v. Spear, 49 Ill. App. 509.

In the opinion of the English Court of Appeals, copyright,
under their statute, cannot be claimed in a cardboard pattern
sleeve, containing upon it scales, figures and
Copyright descriptive words, for adapting it to sleeves of any
dimensions, as a " map,.chart or plan," but, semble, it might
be the subject of patent, as an instrument or tool: Hollinrake
v. Truswell, [1894] 3 Ch. 420; reversing [1893] 2 Ch. 377.
Such a chart has, however, been held the proper subject of
copyright as a "book," under the U. S. statute: Drury v.
Ezoing, i Bond, 540.
The Circuit Court for the Northern District of Alabama,

PROGRESS

OF THE LAW.

Southern District, has held that when the statute requires the
Corporations, directors of a corporation to be stockholders,
holding and owning shares of the capital stock in
Directors
good faith and in their own right, a person who holds and
owns no shares of stock can be elected a director, and
afterwards qualify himself by acquiring the requisite number
of shares in good faith and in his own right: Greenough v.
Ala. & G. S. R. Co., 64 Fed. Rep. 22.
It has been recently decided by Stirling, J., in the Chancery
Division, in England, that when a company, having the power
to distribute its profits as dividends or as capital,
Stock,
declares a dividend, which it is in a position to
Dividend,
Life Estate
pay as cash, and pays one-half in cash, and in
respect of the ba4ance offers an allotment of new shares to
the stockholders, paying the rest of the dividend in cash to
such as do not accept the offer; and trustees for a wife,
tenant for life under the will of a testator who owned shares
in the company, accept the allotment, and allow the new
shares to be allotted to the tenant for life; (i) That the
company intends to distribute the profits as dividends, and not
to capitalize them ; and (2) That the tenant for life is entitled
to only so much of the value of the new shares as represents
the dividend applied by the trustees in taking them up, the balance of such value forming part of the capital of the estate: Zn
re Malam, [1894] 3 Ch. 578. This is in accord with the decision in Hite v. Hite, (Ky.), 20 S. W. Rep. 778. There is an
annotation on this latter case in i AM. L. REG. & REv. (N. S.) 149.
In the opinion of the Supreme Court of Washington, an
agent in charge of a branch store belonging to a corporation
that has a manager exercising general control of
Service,
Managing
the business, including that transacted by such
agent, is not a "managing agent," within a staAgent
tute providing that service on a corporation may be made by
delivering a copy of the summons to its managing agent:
Osborne v. Columbia Co. Farmers'Alliance Corp., 38 Pac. Rep.
16o. The general superintendent of a corporation is within
that description, however: Barrett v. Amer. Telephone &
Telegraph Co., 138 N. Y. 491; S. C., 34 N. E. Rep. 289.
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A very interesting decision on the question of the common
law powers of the federal courts has been rendered by Grosscup, Dist. J., in the Circuit Court for the Northern
Courts,
of Illinois, in Swzi v. Phi/la. & Reading
District
Federal,
Jurisdiction,
.R,6Fe.ep59
R.R., 64 Fed. Rep. 59- He acknowledges the
Commo.
Law

existence of a common law of the United States

in territory under exclusive federal jurisdiction, but denies it
-elsewhere, claiming that within the boundaries of the several
states, there exists no common law of the United States as a
distinct sovereignty, neither the constitution nor Congress
having adopted that law, and the power of the nation to make
laws within the field of power assigned to it by the constitution,,
being exercised only by express enactments of Congress, or
by treaties; and, therefore, an action for excessive rates on
interstate freight cannot be maintained, unless based on the
provisions of the interstate commerce act, as that is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. See Swift
v. Phila. & Reading R. R. Co., 58 Fed. Rep. 858.
The Supreme Court of the United States, Justices Field
.anJ Shiras dissenting, has just enunciated a very important
a
doctrine, which, it is to be hoped, will act as
Federal
check to the unscrupulous abuse of legal process
Question,
by some criminal lawyers, to the effect that,
Caboas
Corpus

except in cases of urgency, (which, of course,
rest in the discretion of the judge), one in custody under process from a state court should not be released by a federal
court on habeas corpus, on the ground that the crime with
which he is charged is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
federal courts, or that he is detained in violation of the federal constitution ; but the decision of the highest court in the
state should be first obtained on the question, and this, if
adverse, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court of the
o
United States: A'tw York v. Eno, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 3 . This,
it is to be hoped, will forever quiet the preposterous claim,
that the mere suggestion of a federal question is enough to
make the issuing of a habeas corpus by the federal courts a
matter of right.
The same court, in Lloyd v. A/atthe-ws, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep.
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70, has very clearly defined the method necessary to properly
raise the question of the " full faith and credit "'
Federal
to be given to the laws of other states, by holdQuestion,
Foreign
ing that when, in an action in a state court, the
Laws

parties plead and claim rights under statutes of
a foreign state, but the defeated party does not plead the
construction given to such statute by the courts of the foreign
state, or put in evidence the laws and the printed books of the
adjudged cases of such state, or prove the common law of
that state by the parol evidence of persons learned in that
law, as required by the law of the state where the action is tried,
such party cannot appeal from the highest court of the latter
state to the Supreme Court of the United States, on the ground
that such court did not give the full faith and credit to the public
acts, records and judicial proceedings of such foreign state,
which the Constitution and laws of the United States require,
and that, therefore, a federal question is presented.
Another very interesting question has recently been passed
upon by the Circuit Court for the Southern District of Ohio
Following

State

Decisions

Eastern District, as to following state decisions,
that when a federal court has decided on demurrer that a state statute, the validity of which

has never been passed upon by the highest court of the state,.
is in violation of the constitution of that state, and afterwards, but before final decree entered in the federal court, the
Supreme Court of that state decides that the statute is constitutional, the federal court will . reverse its former ruling in
deference to the decision of the state court: Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Poe, 64 Fed. Rep. 9.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee has lately rendered a very
sensible decision, in Wilcox v. State, 28 S. W. Rep. 312, tO
the effect that an " irresistible impulse" is not an
Criminal L
Irresistible excuse for crime, when the person who commits
Impulse
it is capable of knowing right from wrong; and
that if a person, otherwise rational, commits a homicide through
delusion on a subject connected with the homicide, he is criminally responsible, provided he was conscious of right and
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-wrong as applied to the act, and had the ability, because of
such consciousness, to choose, by an effort of the will, whether
he would commit the act or not. See 15 Crim. L. Mag. 769.
The Supreme Court of Mississippi has lately been confronted with one of the most singular and absurd defences
Autrefols
that a court of law was ever molested with by the
Attaint
perverted ingenuity of the professional palliators
,of crime. It was gravely claimed that a prosecution for
murder could not be sustained, because, at the time when it
was committed, the accused was a convict under sentence of
imprisonment for life for a previous murder. But the court
was equal to the occasion, and as gravely replied that the plea
of autrefois attaint was never recognized in this country, save
in one case, Crenshaw v. State, Mart. & Yerg. (Tenn.), 122,
and was expressly repudiated in State v. McCarty, I Bay,
334; Hawkins v. State, i Port. (Ala.),'475; that it was not
admissible in this country, because attainder, corruption of
blood, and consequent forfeiture, resulting from convictions
under the common law, do not exist in this country; and that,
even if such were the case, the rule would not apply to the
circumstances of the case in hand: Singleton v. State, i6 So.
Rep. 295.
'The Chancery Division of England, in In re Isaacs, 1894]
3 Ch. 5o6, following Lawes v. Bennett, I Cox, 167, has ruled,
in
Descent and that the purchase money of real estate, sold
'Distribution, pursuance of an option exercisable only after the
Conversion death of the giver, will be treated as personalty,
and go to the personal representatives, though the deceased
died intestate.
The Court of Appeal of England, in Hanbury v. Hantbur,
[1894] 2 Q. B. 315, has held, that when a husband is a partner
in a firm, and entitled to receive a certain sum per
Divorce,
Alimony
month inrespect of his share of the profits, but cannot draw-any further share thereof without the assent of the
other partner, he is to be regarded as having an income, for
purposes of alimony, of only the monthly sum, when that is in
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fact all that he has received for several years, though his actuar
share of profits was much in excess of that, the surplus being
carried to his credit on the partnership books.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska has lately had occasion to
pass upon a complicated state of affairs, in the contested
W.
Elections,elcction case of Hendee v. Hayden, 6o N.
Contest,
Rep. 1034. In one precinct the "spoiled ballots,"
Count
of which several had been cast at the election, had
been, irregularly and contrary to the provisions of the election
laws, but without any fraudulent intent, strung upon the same
string as the ballots cast, but at one end thereof, and in a separate bundle, with the string looped and tied around it, making
a knot which divided the spoiled from the other ballots. On
the trial of the case, the votes cast in that precinct were
brought into court, and the package in which they were enclosed and sealed was opcned, and the ballots recounted; but
during the recount these spoiled ballots were counted with the
ones cast at the election, and so mixed with them as to be
indistinguishable from them. On this state of facts the Supreme
Court held, (i) That the recount, under such circumstances,
did not establish the result of the election as between the contesting parties, and that by the intermingling of the "spoiled"
ballots with the others, they were rendered incompetent as
evidence of the result of the election; (2) That as the will
and choice of the voters expressed at the election, in the
absence of fraud or illegality, should be ascertained, if any
authentic or satisfactory testimony existed by which the result
might be proved, the returns made by the county clerk being
p-ima facie evidence of the facts therein set forth, were competent, and should have been considered by the court; (3)'
That it was not competent, under the circumstances above detailed, to apportion the " spoiled" ballots between the contesting parties, and to deduct from the vote of each a share of
the spoiled ballots, proportioned according to the whole
number of votes cast for him.
The Supreme Court of Illinois, in Miles v. Andrews, 38 N_
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"

E. Rep. 644, has ruled, that when it is admitted that plaintiff
Conversations
by Telephone

and defendant conversed by telephone at a certain

time, a witness who heard one side of the conversation may testify to it, though he could not hear

the replies, and did not know of his own knowledge with
whom the conversation was held; though, perhaps, his testimony is entitled to but little weight.
It is proper to admit statements made by telephone, when
the witness to whom the statements were made testifies that
he knew and recognized the voice of his interlocutor: Stepp
v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. Rep. 349; S. C., 20 S. W. Rep. 753.
And it has even been held that conversations by telephone are
admissible as evidence, though they were carried on through
the medium of an operator at an intermediate station, the
parties being unable to hear each other: Oskamnp v. Gadsden,
(Neb.), 52 N. W. Rep. 718.
The Supreme Court of Missouri has lately held, in State v.
Evans, 28 S. W. Rep. 8, that though the declarations of a
deceased person are inadmissible when first uttered,
yet if he subsequently reaffirms them, under a
consciousness of the fact that he is dying, they are admissible
as dying declarations ; and that when the deceased states that
he is shot to death, his declarations made at the' time are admissible, though he also asks that a physician be sent for, as
such a wish, under the circumstances, shows merely a -desire
to be relieved from pain.
Declarations made when not in expectation of death are
admissible, when subsequently reaffirmed by deceased when
conscious of the approach of death, if re-read or repeated to
him, and then assented to by him: Million v. Comm., (Ky.),
25 S. W. Rep. 1059; Reg. v. Steele, 12 Cox C. C. 168; and
are admissible, if so reaffirmed, even though not repeated or
re-read: Johnson v. State, (Ala.), 16 So. Rep. 99; Peo. v.
Crews, (Cal.), 36 Pac. Rep. 367.
"Sending for a physician will not negative the expectation
of death, if that fact is shown by the declarations: R. v.
Howell, i Den. C. C. i; Mc Queen v. State, (Ala.), 15 So.
Rep. 824; contra, Matherly v. Comm., (Ky.), 19 S.W. Rep. 977.
Dying
Declarations

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

According to the Court of Appeals of Colorado, a letter,
duly addressed, stamped and mailed, with a return card
attached thereto, which has not been returned to
Receipt of
the sender, is conclusively presumed to have been
Letter
received, in the abgence of rebutting evidence: Sherwin v.
atl. Cash Rcgister Co., 38 Pac. Rep. 393. This is in conformity with the general rule on the subject, that proof of
mailing a properly stamped and addressed letter is prima
facie evidence of its receipt by the addressee: Yoztngv. Clapp,
147 Ill. 176; S. C., 35 N. E. Rep. 372; affirming 32 N. E.
Rep. 187; McFarland v. U. S. Mut. Acc. Assn. of City of
. Y., (Mo.), 27 S. W. Rep. 436, and, if not denied, will be
conclusive: Home Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Marple, I Ind. App.
411; and will overcome the merely negative testimony of the
addressee that he did not receive it: In re Wiltse, 25 N. Y.
Suppl. 733 ; S. C., 5 Misc. Rep. 105. This presumption may,
however, be rebutted: Whitmore v. Ins. Co., 148 Pa. 405 ;
S. C., 30 W. N. C. 277; 23 Atl. Rep. I13I ; and, if denied,
becomes a question for the jury; .but a verdict for the plaintiff generally implies a finding that the defendant received the
letter in question: Jensen v. McCorkell, 154 Pa. 323 ; S. C.,
Proof by the secretary
32 W. N. C. 355 ; 26 Atl. Rep. 366.
of a corporation that a letter was folded and enclosed in a
sealed envelope, and put in a basket in the office, in which
letters were usually put for mailing, coupled with the fct that
it was not found among the papers of the corporation, is evidence to go to the jury on the score of mailing, though the
porter whose duty it was to mail the letters put in that
basket did not recollect mailing such a letter: Hastings v.
Brooklyn L. 1. Co., 138 N.Y. 473; S. C., 34 N. E. Rep.
But the date of a
289; affirming 17 N.Y. Suppl. 333.
letter affords no basis for calculating the time of its receipt,
nor proof of the time of mailing, nor that it was ever
mailed: Uhiman v. Arnholt & Schaefer Brewing Co., 53
Fed. Rep. 485.

The Supreme Court of New York, Fifth Department, at
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general term, has affirmed the opinion of the special term, in
Peo. v. Hannan, 3o N. Y. Suppl. 370, holding
that under the treaty between the United States
and Great Britain, which provides for the extradition of persons, " charged with the crime of murder, or assault with
intent to commit murder," a person extradited on a charge of
"assault with intent to commit murder" cannot be convicted
of an assault with intent to do great bodily harm: See i Aim.
L. REG. & REv. (N. S). 814; 28 Am. L. Rev. 568.
Extradition

The Supreme Court of Michigan, in -Thompson v. Mlarley,
6o N. W. Rep. 976, has held, that when a father, who had
been fraudulently induced to execute an absolute
Fraud,
Resulting
deed of his land to one of his children, by repreTrust
sentations that that child would hold it in trust for
the other children, subsequently "executed another deed to that
child for the same land, no fraud being used, such child took
the land free from any trust in favor of the other children,
since, as the fraud used in the procurement of the first deed
merely created a resulting trust in favor of the father, the
express trust being void as not being in writing, the second
deed carried the father's equitable interest.
The Supreme Court of Wyoming has very justly decided,
that when a policy of accident insurance requires an action
thereon to be brought within one year from the
Accident,
date of the happening of the alleged injury, the
Lu-iitation
limitation begins to run at the date of the death of
the insured, and not at the time at which the cause of action
accrues : McFarlandv. Ry. Off. & Empl. Ace. Assn. of Indianapolis, 38 Pac. Rep. 347. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has
improved on this, and asserts that when an accident policy
provided that, in case of death or injury, notice of
Notice
and Proofs
claim should be given to the secretary of the comof Death
pany immediately after the accident, and positive
proof of death should be furnished six months thereafter, as a
condition precedent; and the insured, a tugboat engineer, disappeared November 9, 1892, and his body was found in the
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water near the tugboat April 19, 1893, and notice of death
was furnished May 26, 1893, and proof thereof July 12,
1893; it showed a reasonable compliance with the terms
of the policy: Kenztler v. Am. it. Acc. Assn., 6o N. W.

Rep.

1002.

In the opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois, when an
insurance company, by its adjuster, on being requested to
rebuild a house destroyed by fire, unconditionally
Fire,
Rebuilding, refused to do so, and stated that it would pay the
Waiver
amount of loss when the same was determined by
arbitration, the company elected to pay the loss, and waived
its right to rebuild: Plat v. Etna Ins. Co., 38 N. E. Rep.
580.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina has lately held, in
In re Sultan, 20 S. E. Rep. 375, that a resident of North
Carolina, who, while in Pennsylvania, procured by
Interstate
l~endition,
false representations a shipment of goods from that
Fugitive
place to his residence, and then returned thither,
and there received the goods, and was indicted in Pennsylvania for the false representations, is a "fugitive" from justice,
and may be surrendered on requisition. This is a correct
application to the rule, that a fugitive from justice, within the
meaning of the rendition act, is any one, who, having committed the offence with which he is charged in one state, is
found in another at the time when it is sought to enforce his
criminal liability, irrespective of his motive in leaving the jurisdiction: In re Cook, 49 Fed. Rep. 833; In re White, 55 Fed.
Rep. 54; Roberts v. Reilley, 116 U. S. 8o; S. C., 6 Sup. Ct.
iRep. 291. And it does not matter that he has merely
gone to the place of his domicile: Kingsbury's Case, io6
Mass. 223.
In the same case, it was also held, that when a warrant of
•extradition is granted by the governor, the courts will not, on
habeas corpus, inquire into the motive and purpose
Practice
of the extradition proceedings, to ascertain whether
the object thereof is to punish crime, or collect a debt.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska has laid down the following
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rules: (i) That when, on rendition proceedings, a copy of the
Z in the
Preliminary evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing
state from which the accused has fled, is attached
Hearing,
to the requisition, the court will not, on habeas
Evidence
.corputs, examine into the evidence, to see if it sustains the
charge of crime alleged in the information, or whether it
supports the finding of the examining court that there was
-probable cause to believe that the party committed the crime
,6harged; and (2) That in rendition proceedings, an indictment found is prima fade evidence that the act charged
.amounts to a crime; and when a state has adopted criminal
procedure by information, ard it appears that the person
accused has been given a preliminary hearing, been held to
answer at a higher court, and an information has been filed in
"thatcourt, a copy of which is attached to the requisition, such
information is of as high a grade, as a criminal pleading, as an
indictment, is entitled to the same weight as evidence, and will
be so construed: hn re Van Sceiver, 6o N. W. Rep. 1037.
The court last mentioned has also, in conformity with the
-weight of authority, declared, that when bottles of intoxicating
liquor were each inclosed in a paper wrapper or
lntoxicating
box which was sealed with sealing wax, and a
Liquors,
Original
number of these paper boxes, each containing a
flask of such liquor, was packed in a wooden box
Package
by a party in one state, and shipped to his agent in another
state; and the agent opened the wooden box, took out the
paper boxes in which the flasks of liquor were contained, and
.sold them separately ;-that the wooden box was the original
package, and not the sealed paper box or wrapper, and the
flask therein inclosed: Haley v. State, 6o N. W. Rep. 962.
This is the general opinion: Harrison v. State, 91 Ala. 62;
:S. C., io So. Rep. 30; State v. Chapman, i S. Dak. 414;
S. C., 47 N. W. Rep. 411; In re Harmon, 43 Fed. Rep. 372;
whether the boxes are closed or open: Smith v. State, 54
Ark. 248; S. C., 15 S. W. Rep. 882. See Comm. v. Schollenberger, (Pa.), 27 AtI. Rep. 30; Comm. v. Zelt, 138 Pa. 61 5 ; .
S. C., 21 Atl. Rep. 7. The courts of Iowa have held the con-
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trary: State v. Coonan, 82 Iowa, 400; S. C., 48 N. W. Rep.
921; State v. lMiller, (Iowa), 53 N.W. Rep. 330; though even
there a sale of such bottles over the bar, with permission to
the purchasers to open them on the premises, and facilities
furnished for drinking the contents, has been held not a sale
from the original package ; a doctrine utterly inconsistent with
the former one: Hopkins v. Lewis, 84 Iowa, 690; S. C., 51
N. W. Rep. 255. If, however, the bottles are separately
wrapped and labelled, and delivered to a carrier, and the latter,
for its own convenience, puts them in a box furnished by itself,
and fastened to the floor of the car, so as to be virtually a part
thereof, the bottles, and not the box, are then the original packages: Keith v. State, (Ala.), 8 So. Rep. 353; and the same
rule applies to any box furnished by the carrier without the
knowledge of the consignor, whether fastened to the car or
not: Tinker v. State, 96 Ala. i 15; S. C., ii So. Rep. 383.
According to the opinion of ROMER, J., of the Chancery
Division, a covenant in a lease not to erect or build on the
demised premises, without the written consent of
Lease,
Covenant
the lessor, "any other building whatsoever," save
and except a stable and coach-house, is violated by the
erection, without the lessor's consent, above the boundary
fence of the premises, of an open trellis-work screen of wood,
about fifty-eight feet long and twelve feet high, which interfered to some extent with the light flowing to the ground floor
windows of the adjacent premises, held on a lease from the
same lessor, with covenants similar to those of the defendant;
and that, under the circumstances, the erection was also a
breach of a covenant not to do on the demised premises any
act, matter or thing, which might be an annoyance or nuisance
to any tenant of the lessor: Wood v. Cooper, [1894] 3 Ch.
671.
The Supreme Court of Missouri has recently decided, that
when an owner of valuable mineral lands makes a lease of
them, in consideration that the lessee will establish
Rescission
manufactories thereon, and dig and quarry stone
or other mineral therefrom, and of the payment of one dollar
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per carload of mineral mined; and the lessee fails to erect
manufactories or work the mineral, but, one year thereafter,
agrees with several manufacturers not to work the mineral for
three years; the lessor may rescind the contract: Oliver v.
Goetz, 28 S. W. Rep. 441.
The Supreme Court of Oregon holds, that when a libelous
article does not name the person alluded to therein, witnesses
may testify, on a criminal prosecution, that, in
Libet,
Person Meant reading the article, they, understood, from their
acquaintance with the prosecuting witness and the circumstances alluded to in the -article, that it was intended to refer
to him: State v. Mason, 38 Pac. Rep. 130. So, when a witness testifies that the words used referred to the plaintiff, and
.that he knew the defendant was talking about the plaintiff, the
evidence is sufficient to prove that the words were spoken of
the plaintiff: Dexter v. Harrison, (Ill.) 34 N. E. Rep. 46. But,
when a libelous article is ambiguous, a witness may not state
to x.hom, in his opinion, it refers, but, after simply replying in
the affirmative to the question, "Do you know to whom it
applied?" may subsequently give facts and circumstances
which show who was pointed to by the publication: Sinith
v. Sun Pub. Co., 50 Fed. Rep. 399. If the plaintiff's name is
used by mistake, there being no intention to refer to him, and
the name is not accurately given, there can be no recovery:
Hanson v. Globe Newspaper Co., (Mass.), 34 N. E. Rep. 462.
The Court of Appeals of Colorado has reached the just
decision that a newspaper article, giving an account of a person's arrest, and stating that he has been guilty of
Privilege
infamous crimes, though published in good faith,
is not privileged: Republican Pub. Co. v. Conroy, 38 Pac. Rep.
423; See Democrat Pub. Co. v. Jones, 83 Tex. 302. An
accusation of crime will not be privileged, merely because the
person accused is a public official, or a candidate for office:
Upton v. Hume, (Oreg.), 33 Pac. Rep. 81o; Post. Pub. Co. v.
Rallam, 59 Fed. Rep. 53o , affirming Hallamv. Post.Pub. Co.,
55 Fed. Rep. 456.
The Court of Appeal of England, in Mellin v. White,
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[1894] 3 Ch. 276, has lately passed upon a very interesting
case of trade libel. White, a chemist, was supTrade
Libel
plied by Alin with " Mellin's Infants' Food,"
made up in bottles, and labelled. White sold it at retail, first
affixing to each bottle a notice as follows: "The public are
recommended to try Dr. Vance's Prepared Food for Infants
and Invalids, it being far more healthful and nutritious than
any other preparation yet offered." White was the owner of
Dr. Vance's preparation. Mel/in brought an action for an
injunction to restrain White from affixing these notices, and
adduced evidence to show that his food was much better than
Dr. Vance's, especially for infants under six months of age;
but the case was dismissed by the judge below, after hearing
the plaintiff's evidence, without calling on the defendant, on
the ground that the defendant's notice was a mere puff of Dr..
Vance's preparation, and gave the plaintiff no legal ground of
complaint. This was held error by the Court of Appeal, for if,
on the whole of the evidence, it should appear that the statement contained in the defendant's notice was a false statement
about the plaintiff's goods, and to the disparagement of them,
and had injured, or was likely to injure the plaintiff, the action
would lie.
False statements concerning the goods or business of
another are actionable, if special damage results: Western
Cos. Manure Co. v. Lawes Chem. Manure Co., 9 L. R. Exch.
218. Such are insinuations that goods are spurious : Thomas
v. Williams, 14 Ch. D. 864; or that a patent is infringed by
the articles manufactured by the plaintiff: Flint v. Hutchinson
Smoke Burner Co., I IO Mo. 492; See Grand Rapids School
Furniture Co. v. Haney School Furniture Co., 92 Mich. 558;
S. C., 52 N.W. Rep.

1O9.

If the words used are not actiona-

ble per se, but constitute an untrue statement, maliciously published concerning plaintiff's business, which statement is intended, or is reasonably likely to produce, and in the ordinary
course of things does produce a general loss of business, as
distinct from the loss of particular known customers, evidence
of such general loss of business is admissible, and sufficient to
support the action: Ratcliffe v. Evans, [1892] 2 Q. B. 524.
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The Supreme Court of Rhode Island has lately ruled that
when a corporation, being financially embarrassed, places its
of affairs in the hands of a committee of its creditors,
for adjustment and settlement, the payment of a
dividend by the committee to a creditor of the corporation, is
such a voluntary payment by the corporation as will take the
claim of that creditor out of the statute of limitations: Peabody v. Tenney, 30 Atl. Rep. 456.
Limitation
Actions

According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
North Carolina, while, ordinarily, the dismissal of a warrant
Malicious by a justice of the peace, with the consent of the
Prosecution party prosecuting, is a sufficient determination of
the proceeding to authorize an action for malicious prosecution; yet, when the prosecution is dismissed by an agreement
between the parties, by which the party prosecuted is to pay
part of the costs, the burden, in an action for malicious prosecution, of showing probable cause, is not thrown on the
defendant: Welch v. Cook, 20 S. E. Rep. 460.
A discharge by a justice on preliminary examination is a
sufficient termination of the prosecution to found an action
for malicious prosecution: .Dreyfus v. Au1, 29 Neb. 191 ; even
when he was at first inclined to hold the accused to bail, but
discharged him on a promise of good behavior: Robbins v.
Robbins, 133 N. Y. 597; S. C., 30 N. E. Rep. 9 77. The
same is true of an entry of nolle prosequi: Woodman v. Prescott, (N. H.), 22 Atl. Rep. 456.
But when a magistrate discharges a prisoner without investigation into the merits, and
for lack of jurisdiction, and a prosecution is afterwards
brought in another county for the same offence, and a nolle
prosequi is entered with the consent of the prosecutor, and
after having the advice of counsel, that, aside from the truth
of the charge, the prosecution is likely to fail for the same
reason, neither discharge can be considered as a fact from
which to infer malice or want of probable cause: MfcClafferty
v. Pilp, 15I Pa. 86; S. C., 3 0 W. N. C. 539; 24 Atl. Rep.
1042 ; and when, after a criminal complaint entered in the
supreme court on appeal, a nolleprosequi is entered by the.
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prosecuting officer by the procurement of the defendant's
attorney, his discharge, not being ordered by the court, is not
such a termination of the prosecution as will enable him to
maintain an action for malicious prosecution: Langford v.
Boston & Albany R. R. Co., 144 Mass. 431 ; S. C., i i N. E.
Rep. 697. So, when the justice, instead of committing the
prisoner, decided that, though "no wrong was intended, the
act was wrong and unlawful," and discharged the prisoner on
the latter paying a fine of one dollar and costs, and expressing regret for what he had done, declaring that he intended
no wrong, and asking for mercy, the discharge is not sufficient to disprove probable cause: Hergenratherv. Spielnan,
(Md.), 22 Atl. Rep. i io6. If a prosecution for a penalty is
settled by agreement of the parties, it is a sufficient termination of the prosecution to found an action: Sulton v. JvcConncll, (Wis.), 5o N. W. Rep. 414.
Kekewich, J., of the Chancery Division, has lately made
an interesting ruling on the question of the enforcement of
Master
a contract for personal services, in Davis v. ForeIn that case, an agreeandServant, mzan, [1894] 3 Ch. 654.
Injunction ment for the employment of a manager of a business house contained a clause providing that the employer
would not, ex.cept in the case of misconduct or a breach of the
agreement, require the manager to leave his employ. The
employer, however, gave the manager a notice, purporting to
determine the agreement and the service created thereby; and
the manager thereupon brought an action for an injunction to
restrain the employer from acting on the notice. But the
court held, that though the clause above mentioned was negative in form, it was affirmative in substance, being equivalent
to a stipulation by the employer that he would retain the
manager in his employ, and an injunction ought not to be
granted.
This case is almost unique, the complaint usually coming from
the master. Perhaps the only parallel instance to be found is in
Booth v. Brown, 62 Fed. Rep. 794, which, however, was decided without reference to this question, the court seeming to
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admit that it possessed the power, in a proper case, to relieve the
complainants, (strikers discharged from a railroad operated by
receivers), though this may be questioned. The circumstances
in Johnson v. Shrewsbury & Birmingham R. R. Co., 3 De G.,
M. & G. 914, were somewhat similar, but not parallel. The
analogy with the cases where the master seeks to enforce the
service of his employ6 is complete, nevertheless, and the same
rules apply.
The general rule is, that a contract for services cannot be
specifically enforced: Stocker v. Brockelbank, 3 MacN. & G.
250 ; nor can this be done indirectly, by an injunction restraining the employ6 from leaving the service: Arthur v. Oakes,
63 Fed. Rep. 31o, reversing, pro tanto, Farmer's Loan &
Trust Co. v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 6o Fed. Rep. 803. See i AM.
L. REG. & REV. (N. S.) 865. But if the contract of service
contains a negative stipulation, not to perform services for
another during the period of employment, that stipulation may
be enforced by injunction: Lumley v. Wagner, i De G., M. &
G. 604, affirming 5 De G. & Sm. 485 ; Gimston v. Cuningham, [1894] I -Q.B. 125 ; Duff v. Russell, 133 N. Y. 678 ;
S. C., 31 N. E. Rep. 622, affirming 16 N. Y. Suppl. 958, &
14 N. Y. Suppl. 134, Hoyt v. Fuller, 19 N. Y. Suppl. 962.
If, however, the contract contains no negative stipulation, none
will be inferred, and an injunction will not be granted. Thus,
when the manager of a manufacturing company merely agreed
to give his whole time to the company's business during a
specified term, the company was held not entitled to an
injunction to restrain him from giving, during the term, a part
of his time to a rival company: Whitwood Chemical Co. v.
Hardman, [1891] 2 Ch. 416; disapproving Montague v.
Flockton, 16 L. R. Eq. i89, which asserted the contrary.
See Fechter v. Montgomery, 33 Beav. 22. The true distinction
would seem to be, as suggested in Whitwood v. Chem. Co.,
supra, that the injunction will only be granted when the
employ6 is one who has a special qualification for the service,
and cannot be readily replaced, so that his performing similar
services for another would occasion great and irreparable
damage to the employer; otherwise not. A sensible middle
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course was taken in Webster v. Dillon, 3 Jur. (N. S.) 432,
where an injunction was granted to restrain an actor from
acting at any other theatre during the time that the employer's
theatre was ordinarily open for public performances.
The Supreme Cofirt of Pennsylvania, in Fralick v. Despar,
30 At. Rep. 52 1, has held, that when an employ6 has entered
into an agreement, prior to entering the service,,
Trade
not to divulge or use any secrets of the business
Secrets
the employer might make known to him, but subsequently
leaves the plaintiff's employ and begins the manufacture of
similar goods, using plaintiff's secret processes, he will
be restrained from so doing by injunction. To the sameeffect are Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452; Salomon v.
Hertz, 4o N. J. Eq. 40o; S. C., 2 Atl. Rep. 379.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has also decided, that
when the husband contracts in his own name for the erection
of a building on his wife's land, and she, with full
Mechanics'
Liens
knowledge of her husband's contract, converses
with the contractors in regard to the work, and makes no
objection at any time during its progress, she is liable to a
scire facias sur mechanics lien: Jobe v. Hunter, 30 Atl. Rep.
452.

In the opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois, a tenant
in common of a reversion, subject to a life estate, may maintain a suit for partition againt his co-tenant before
Partition,
the expiration of the life estate: Drake v. Merkle,.
Life Estate
38 N. E. Rep. 654. It has been held that there can be no
partition in praesenti between a' life tenant and a remainderman : Stansbury v. Ingleart, 19 Wash. Law Repr. 594 ; but
in Alabama lands may be sold for partition among tenants in
common, though the surviving husband of a deceased tenant
in common has a life estate in his wife's undivided interest:
icQueen v. Turner, 91 Ala. 273 ; and in Missouri the life
tenant and a remainder-man may maintain partition against
the other remainder-men, though there are contingent estates
in the land which may afterwards be vested in persons not in
esse : Sikemeier v. Galvin, 27 S.W. Rep. 55 1.
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The same court also holds that the wives of tenants in
common are not necessary parties to suits for partition, since
Parties

their inchoate dower rights are subject to the

expectant liability of the loss of their husbands'
seisin by partition sale: .Davis v. Lang-, 38 N. E. Rep. 635.
The House of Lords, in Love/ v. Beauchzamp, [1894] App.
Cas. 607, has decided an interesting point in regard to partnership, viz.: That in an action against a firm, of
Partnership,
Infant
which it appears that one partner is an infant, for
goods supplied to the firm, judgment cannot be recovered
against the firm simply, but may be recovered against the
"defendants other than" the infant partner.
The Supreme Court of the United States, with a display of
erudition worthy of a better cause, and even suspiciously
elaborate, has solemnly laid down the principle'
Patents
that the United States is at liberty to appropriate
and use a patented invention, without any compensation to the,
inventor: Schilinger v. United States, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 85.
Verily, it is not strange that we are a nation of defaulters and
swindlers, when both Congress and the Supreme Court seem
to thus disregard the national honor. It is only just to those
gentlemen, however, to state that Justices Harlan and Shiras
dissented.
According to the Supreme Court of California, an exhibit
attached to a complaint, and referred to therein, becomes
Pleading

a part thereof, though the complaint does not
expressly make it a part: Savings Bank of San

Diego Co. v. Burns, 38 Pac. Rep. 102. There is an annotation on this subject in I AM. L. REG. & REv. (N. S.) 307.
The Supreme Court of Kansas has lately decided, that
when a railroad company procures competent surgeons to
Rairoads,

attend a brakeman, injured in its employ, and

Liability

proceeds to transport him to a hospital, in pursu-

ance of the advice and direction of such surgeons, and com-
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plies with all their directions as to his safety and care, it is not
liable for any mistake, error in judgment, or want of foresight
on the part of the surgeons: Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v.
Zeiler, 38 Pac. Rep. 282.
The Supreme Court of Michigan has lately settled a curious
complication of affairs in a replevin suit. Both parties were
mortgagees, the plaintiff having the prior lien.
The jury found the value of the property, and
that it was wrongfully detained by the defendants. The plaintiff had taken the property into possession, under the writ.
The court below directed a verdict to be entered for the
defendants to the amount of their lien. This was held error,
and that the defendants were not entitled to a money judgment against the plaintiff for their lien, without first tendering
to the plaintiff the amount of his prior lien: Olin v. Lockwood, 6o N. W. Rep. 972.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina is of opinion,
that a statement that a person is a "1forger," is not per se
actionable, when coupled with a charge of some
Slander
specific act, which of itself does not constitute
forgery : Barnes v. Crawford, 20 S. E. Rep. 386.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in State v. Mayor of
Newark, 30 Atl. Rep. 543, holds, that if an amendatory
statute changes a section of the prior statute, by
Statutes,
Amendment merely eliminating one of its provisions, the recital
at length of the section so amended, in compliance with the
constitutional direction, will not be deemed a re-enactment of
the provisions which are retained, so as to repeal all laws
which are then inconsistent with them. This seems hardly
consistent with the ruling in Peo. v. Wibmerdii'g-, 136 N. Y.
363 ; S. C., 32 N. E. Rep. lO99, that an amended statute is
wholly merged in the amending statute, and if the latter is
repealed, the former is not re ived, but falls with it. It would
be a better statement of the last proposition to say that the
amending statute is merged in the one amended, so that the
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repeal operates really on the prior statute. See an annotation on the subject of amendments to statutes, in i AM. L.
REG. & REv. (N. S.) 566.
The Supreme Court of Colorado has ruled, that on an issue
as to whether an act was passed in conformity with the conPassage

stitutional

requirements

as to procedure, resort

may be had to the journals of the two houses of
the legislature, to ascertain the steps taken by each in its
passage: Robertson v. Peo., 38 Pac. Rep. 326. This seems to
be the proper doctrine: Currie v. So.'Pac. Ry. Co., 21 Oreg.
566; S. C., 28 Pac. Rep. 884; though there are some courts
which still ascribe to an act, signed and enrolled, the divinity
that doth hedge a king, (presumably to save themselves labor):
Boyd v. U. S., 143 U. S. 649; .Williams v. Taylor, (Tex.), 19
S. W. Rep. 156. The journals, however, are of value only
when they present positive evidence of neglect of constitutional
requirements: Currie v. So. Pac.Ry. Co;, supra; merely negative evidence, ly silence, is not enough to rebut the presumption of validity due to enrolment: Mass. Mut. L. I. Co. v. Colo.
Loan & Tr. Co., (Colo.), 36 Pac. Rep. 793; unless the constitution requires the omitted facts to be noted: Flis v. ElIis,
(Minn.), 56 N. W. Rep. 1O56.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has also held, in State
v. State, 30 Att. Rep. 480, that the title of an act, under the
Title
constitutional provision that every law shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed
in the title, is not only an indication of the legislative intent,
btit also a limitation upon the enacting part of the law. Therefore, if any parts of the statute are beyond the scope of the
title, they must be dropped, if independent, so that the act
may stand: Hendrickson v. Fries, 45 N. J. L. 55 5; Dobbins
v. Northampton, 50 N. J. L. 496; S. C., 14 AtI. Rep. 587;
State v. Becker, (S. Dak.), 51 N. W. Rep. io18 ; but, if the
invalid portion of the act appears on inspection to have been
-an inducement to its passage, the whole act is void : Trumble
v. Trumble, (Neb.), 55 N. W. Rep. 869.
The Court of Appeal of England has recently given a very
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important decision in regard to the use of trade-names, in
Birmingham Vinegar Brewery Co., [ 1894]
)Powellv.
Trade
Name
3 Ch. 449. The plaintiff and his predecessors in
trade had for thirty-four years made and sold a sauce, under
the name of " Yorkshire Relish," these words being printed
upon labels on the bottles, and upon the wrappers. In 1884
the plaintiff registered the words "Yorkshire Relish " as his
trade-mark, but in 1893 that trade-mark was, at the instance
of the defendants, removed from the register. Down to
November, 1893, no sauce but plaintiff's was on the market
under the name of "Yorkshire Relish," but about that time
the defendants began to place on the market a sauce, which
they also described as "Yorkshire Relish." This name was
printed on the labels placed on their bottles, and on the
wrappers of the bottles, but the labels differed in their gneral appearance from those of the plaintiff, and there was a
statement on both the labels and the wrappers that the sauce
was manufactured by the defendants. The plaintiff brought
an action to restrain the defendants from passing off, or attempting to pass off, their sauce as his. Upon a motion for an
interim injunction, evidence was given by a chemist, who had
analyzed both sauces, that there was a wide difference between
them. It was held, however, that the defendants had not sufficiently distinguished their sauce from plaintiff's, and that an
interim injunction must be granted, restraining them from
using the words " Yorkshire Relish," as descriptive of or in
connection with their sauce, without clearly distinguishing
their sauce from that made by plaintiff.
A trade-name, to be the sole property of its user, must be
either artificial and arbitrary, or have acquired an arbitrary
meaning in that connection; and not be merely descriptive of
the article manufactured or sold. The inventor of a patented
substance, wholly new, who has given it a distinctive name, is
not entitled to the exclusive use of that name, after the expiration of his patent, disconnected with any other distinguishing
titles, as against other makers of the same articles, (presumably on the ground that it is merely descriptive of that article):
Linoleum Mfg. Co. v. Nairin, 7 Ch. D. 834. But if the
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name bears no relation to the subject-matter, it is a good
trade-name: Braham v. Bustard, i H. & M. 447; Nassau v.
Thorley's Cattle Food Co., 14 Ch. D. 748; Montgoymery v.
Thompson, [189i] App. Cas. 217. See an annotation on this
subject, in i Am. L. REG. & REV. (N. S.) 5 [4. But, in any
case, though the right to use the name may not be exclusively
in the plaintiff, yet, if the defendant's description of his articles
is likely to deceive purchasers, and induce them to suppose
those articles are made by the plaintiff, the latter is entitled to
an injunction, without proof of actual intent to deceive: Reddaze,ai' v. Bentham Hemp Spinning Co., [I892] 2 Q. B. 639.
The Supreme Court of Washington has recently held, that
it is unlawful for a water company, although a riparian owner
at the point of diversion, to deprive other riparian
proprietors of the use of a stream, by diverting
therefrom, and not returning thereto, large quantities of water;
and that the mere facts (i) That a stream of water, flowing
into a swamp, spreads out into a broad sheet, with currents,
covering a large area of low ground, to which the appellation
of swamp or lake has been given; and (2) That a stream,
having a bed, banks, and current, has been deepened artificially
for drainage purposes, or that it is at times dry; will not
deprive it of its character as a water course: Rigne, v.
Tacoma Light & Mater Co., 38 Pac. .Rep. I47.
In the absence of statutory provisions, a Water company has
only the rights of a riparian proprietor; and cannot exercise
those rights to the damage of other riparian owners below
or above; nor interfere with their exercise of their rights:
Saunders v. Bluefelds Waterworks & Imp. Co., 58 Fed. Rep.
133; Barre Water Co. v. Carnes, 65 Vt. 626; S. C., 27 AtI.
Rep. 6o9.
Water

cor-nPnies

The Irish Chancery Division has lately uttered an opinion,
extremely interesting for its refined technicality, to the effect
that when a testator drew a will in his own handWis'
Execution
writing, signed it, and subsequently added something also signed, in which he referred to the above as his last
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will; summoned witnesses into his room, who saw the paper
ther6, signed with the two signatures; acknowledged his signature in their presence, pointing, according to the evidence, to the
first signature in doing so, and directed the witnesses to sign
opposite that; and thereafter executed a codicil duly attested;
the first and third parts of the paper were to be regarded ashis will, and the second should be excluded: Woodroofe v.
Creed, [ 1894] 1 Ir.R. 508.
In the Chancery Division of England, Stirling, J., has
recently decided a noteworthy case: In re Deakin, [1894]
3 Ch. 565. In that case, a testator, by his will,
gave all his property to his wife for life, and after
her death directed the payment of legacies, and gave a moiety
of the residue to his wife's "relations," as she might direct.
The testator's wife was born out of wedlock, but her parents
married after her birth, and had other children; she was
always recognized by her parents as their child, and no differerlce was made between her and her natural brothers and
sisters. The testator was aware of his wife's origin, and at the
date of his will she was forty-seven years old, and childless.
She survived him, and by her will purported to exercise the
power in favor of children and grandchildren of her natural
brothers and sisters. Under these circumstances, the court
held that the word " relations " must be construed as meaning
those persons who would have been heF relations if she had
been legitimate; but thai the power was good as to the rest
of kin only, and .didnot include an illegitimate nephew.
As a general rule, if there is nothing in the will to show a
contrary intention, the word "relatives" means only legitimates: izre Saville's Trusts, 14 W. R. 603 ; and even when
the testator had always treated his two illegitimate children,
by a woman whom he afterwards married, as his children, and
had none by her after marriage, but left a will by which his
property was to be divided among "my children by her," it
was held that the illegitimates took no interest: Dorin v.
Dorin, 7 L. R. H. L. 568. This decision, however, is too
unjust to require 'comment, and can hardly be law at the
present day. When a testator, in the previous part of his.
Construction,
--Relations"
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will, mentioned illegitimates by name as his "cousins," a
residuary bequest to his relatives thereinbefore named, was held
to include those illegitimates: In rejodrell,44 Ch. D. 590.
Similarly the word "children," in a will, means prima
_fade legitimate children; but a gift to illegitimate living children as a class may be good, if the words used by the testator
clearly show that such children were intended to be objects of
his bounty: Hill v. Crook, 6 L. R. H. L. 265.
Semnbe, that the word "relations" used in a will means
only persons within the statute of distribution: Gallagher v.
Crooks, 132 N. Y. 338; S. C., 30 N. F. Rep. 746.

